Antitrust Litigation
The attorneys at Faruqi & Faruqi, LLP represent direct purchasers and competitors in a variety of individual and class action antitrust cases brought under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. These actions, which typically seek treble damages under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, have been commenced by businesses and consumers who have been injured by anticompetitive agreements to fix prices or allocate markets, conduct that excludes or delays competition, and other monopolistic or conspiratorial conduct that harms competition. Current and past matters include the following:
• In re Aftermarket Filters Antitrust Litigation, No. 08-4883 (N.D. Ill.) (representing a proposed class of direct purchasers of filters challenging conspiracy to fix prices, in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act)
• In re Aggrenox Antitrust Litig., No. 14-2516 (D. Conn.) (representing a pharmaceutical wholesaler and a proposed class of direct purchasers of Boehringer Ingelheim’s combination stroke prevention drug, Aggrenox, alleging that Boehringer paid its would-be generic competitors to delay launching their less-expensive generic versions of Aggrenox) (settled for $146 million)
• In re AndroGel Antitrust Litigation (II), No. 09-2084 (N.D. Ga.) (representing a proposed class of direct purchasers of drug AndroGel, alleging that the manufacturer of drug AndroGel entered into anticompetitive settlement agreements designed to delay generic competition in violation of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act)
• Babyage.com, Inc., et al. v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., No. 05-6792 (E.D. Pa.) (representing two retailers challenging dominant retailer and co-conspirator suppliers’ anticompetitive scheme to impose and enforce resale price maintenance in violation of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and state law) (settled for undisclosed amount)
• In re Blood Reagents Antitrust Litigation, No. 09-2081 (E.D. Pa.) (representing a proposed class of direct purchasers of blood reagent products, challenging conspiracy to fix prices, in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act)
• Broadway v. JP Morgan Chase & Co. et al., No. 11-cv-00398 (E.D.N.Y.) (representing proposed class of silver traders against investment firms alleging conspiracy to depress and manipulate the price of COMEX silver futures and option contracts in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act)
• Brownson v. Furukawa Electric Co., Ltd. et al., No. 11-14831(E.D. Mich.) (representing proposed class of users of wire harnesses in automobiles against parts manufactures who pleaded guilty to Department of Justice charges of an conspiracy to fix prices, violating § 1 of the Sherman Act)
• Castro et al. v. Sanofi Pasteur, Inc., No. 11-cv-07178 (D. N. J.) (representing pediatricians and practice groups again children’s vaccine maker for tying and bundling in an abuse of monopoly power in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act)
• In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litigation, No. 08-MD-1935 (M.D. Pa.) (representing direct purchasers of chocolate products challenging conspiracy to fix prices, in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act)
• Connecticut Children’s Medical Center v. Lundbeck, Inc., No. 09-1652 (D. Minn.) (representing a class of direct purchasers of drugs Indocin and NeoProfen alleging monopolization under §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and § 7 of the Clayton Act) (settled)
• In re Delta/AirTran Baggage Fee Antitrust Litigation, No. 09-MD-2089 (N.D. Ga.) (representing a proposed class of direct purchasers challenging conspiracy to fix baggage fees by two major airlines, in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act)
• In re Effexor Antitrust Litigation, No. 11-196 (D.N.J.) (representing a proposed class of direct purchasers of drug Effexor XR, alleging that the manufacturer, in concert with a generic manufacturer, engaged in an anticompetitive scheme to delay generic competition in violation of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act) (Faruqi & Faruqi is on the Executive Committee)
• In re Endosurgical Products Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litigation, No. 05-CV-8809 (C.D. Cal.) (represented a proposed class of direct purchasers of endosurgical products manufactured by Johnson and Johnson, challenging bundled pricing and exclusionary contracting scheme that violated §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act) (settled)
• F & V Oil Company, Inc., et al v. Reddy Ice Holdings, Inc., et al., No. 08-11152 (E.D. Mich.) (representing class of direct purchasers against manufacturers of packaged ice alleging conspiracy to fix prices and allocate markets in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act) (partially settled)
• In re Hypodermic Products Antitrust Litigation, No. 05-1602 (D.N.J.) (representing a proposed class of direct purchasers challenging monopolistic conduct by Becton Dickinson and Company in the sale of hypodermic syringes and related products) (settled for $45M)
• In re Iowa Ready-Mixed Concrete Antitrust Litigation, No. C 10-4038 (N.D. Ia.) (representing direct purchasers alleging producers and seller sellers of ready-mixed concrete conspired to fix prices in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act) (settled for $18.5 million)
• Isaac Industries, Inc. v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours and Company, et al., No. 10-00323-RDB (D. Md.) (representing proposed class of direct purchasers of titanium dioxide against manufacturers alleging a conspiracy to fix prices in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act)
• Jimico Enterprises, Inc., et al. v. Lehigh Gas Corp., No. 07-578 (N.D.N.Y.) (representing several terminated gas stations alleging violations of the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act) (judgment for plaintiffs)
• King Drug Company of Florence, Inc., et al. v. Cephalon, Inc., et al., No. 06-1797 (E.D. Pa.) (representing direct purchasers of drug Provigil alleging Cephalon conspired with generic competitors as part of a larger scheme to monopolize in violation of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act) (settled for $512 million)
• In re Lidoderm Antitrust Litig., No. 14-2521 (N.D. Cal.) (representing a pharmaceutical wholesaler and a proposed class of direct purchasers of Endo’s 5% lidocaine patch, Lidoderm, alleging that Endo paid its would-be generic competitor, Watson (now known as Actavis) hundreds of millions of dollars to delay entering the market with less-expensive generic versions of Lidoderm for 13 months) (Faruqi & Faruqi is co-lead counsel) (settled for $166 million)
• In re Lipitor Antitrust Litigation, No. 3:12-cv-2389 (PGS/DEA) (D.N.J.) (representing a proposed class of direct purchasers of Lipitor alleging that Pfizer and a generic drug company, Ranbaxy, conspired to delay generic atorvastatin calcium competition)
• In re Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust Litig., No. 13-2472 (D.R.I.) (representing a pharmaceutical wholesaler and a proposed class of direct purchasers of Warner Chilcott’s oral contraceptive drug, Loestrin 24 Fe, alleging that Warner Chilcott and would-be generic competitors entered into a “pay for delay” conspiracy, to prevent purchasers from benefitting from lower-priced generic competition) (Faruqi & Faruqi is co-lead counsel) (settled for $120 million)
• Marchese v. Cablevision Systems Corporation, No. 2:10-cv-02190 (D.N.J.) (representing a proposed class of direct purchasers of two-way cable services from Cablevision, accusing Cablevision of illegally tying those services to rentals of a Cablevision-supplied set-top box)
• Marchbanks Truck Service, Inc., et al. v. Comdata Network, Inc., et al., No. 07-1078-JKG-HSP (E.D. Pa.) (representing proposed class of independent truck stops against fleet card issuer and chain truckstops for abuse of monopoly power and tying and bundling in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act)
• Mark S. Wallach, et al. v. Eaton Corp., et al., No. 10-260 (D. Del.) (representing purchasers of truck transmissions alleging exclusive dealing agreements between Eaton Corp. and OEMs to keep the price for truck transmissions artificially high in violation of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and § 3 of the Clayton Act) (Faruqi & Faruqi is on the Executive Committee)
• In re Metoprolol Succinate Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litigation, 06-52 (D. Del.) (representing pharmaceutical wholesaler and proposed class of direct purchasers challenging the conduct of AstraZeneca in delaying generic drug competition, in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act) (settled for $20 million)
• Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Public Limited Company, et al., No. 12-3824 (E.D. Pa.) (representing a proposed class of direct purchasers of drug Doryx, alleging that the manufacturer engaged in an anticompetitive scheme to delay generic competition in violation of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act) (Faruqi & Faruqi is co-lead counsel, settled for $15 million)
• In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litigation, No. 1:12-md-02409-WGY (D. Mass.) (representing pharmaceutical wholesaler and proposed class of direct purchasers of the prescription drug Nexium, alleging that the brand manufacturer entered into illegal reverse-payment agreements with certain generic manufacturers to delay the entry of more affordable generic Nexium)
• In re Niaspan Antitrust Litig., No. 13-cv-1820 (E.D. Pa.) (representing a pharmaceutical wholesaler and a proposed class of direct purchasers of Abbott Laboratories’ niacin drug, Niaspan, alleging that Abbott paid successive would-be generic competitors to delay launching less-expensive generic versions of Niaspan)
• In re Online DVD Rental Antitrust Litigation, No. 09-2029 (N.D. Cal.) (representing a proposed class of subscribers to Netflix alleging a per se illegal market allocation agreement between it and Walmart) (partial settlement for approximately $27 million)
• In re Pennsylvania Title Ins. Antitrust Litigation, No. 08-1202 (E.D. Pa.) (Faruqi & Faruqi partner Peter Kohn was co-lead counsel in this pending action on behalf of direct purchasers of title insurance alleging illegal cartel pricing under § 1 of the Sherman Act)
• In re Prandin Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litigation, No. 10-12141AC-DAS (E.D. Mich.) (representing a pharmaceutical wholesaler and proposed class of direct purchasers challenging the conduct of Novo Nordisk A/S in manipulating regulatory framework and patent laws to delay generic drug competition in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act) (Faruqi & Faruqi is on the Executive Committee)
• In re Ready-Mixed Concrete Antitrust Litigation, No. 05-979 (S.D. Ind.) (represented a proposed class of direct purchasers of ready-mixed concrete challenging conspiracy to fix prices, in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act) (settled in excess of $40 million)
• Rhodes v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, et al., No. 09-5378 (N.D. Cal.) (representing a proposed class of Division 1 college athletes and former athletes against the NCAA and its licensing agent alleging conspiracy to preclude athletes from profiting from use of their images in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act)
• Rochester Drug Co-Operative, Inc., et al. v. Braintree Labs, Inc., No. 07-142-SLR (D. Del.) (representing a pharmaceutical wholesaler and proposed class of direct purchasers of drug MiraLax alleging and anticompetitive scheme to delay generic competition in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act) (settled for $17.25 million)
• In re Skelaxin (Metaxalone) Antitrust Litigation, No. 12-2343 (E.D. Tenn.) (representing a proposed class of direct purchasers of the muscle relaxant Skelaxin alleging that King and a generic drug company, Mutual, conspired to delay entry of generic Skelaxin) (settled for $73 million)
• In re Solodyn Antitrust Litig., No. 14-10438 (D. Mass.) (representing a pharmaceutical wholesaler and a proposed class of direct purchasers of Medicis’s minocycline drug, Solodyn, alleging that Medicis engaged in an anticompetitive scheme to prevent lower-priced generic competition from entering the market) (settled for $75 million)
• Sotomayor v. Hachette Book Group Inc., et al., No. 11-05707 (S.D.N.Y.) (representing a proposed class of e-book purchasers alleging a horizontal conspiracy among book publishers and e-book sellers in the United States to raise, fix, stabilize and maintain retail prices of e-books)
• In re Suboxone (Buprenorphine Hydrochloride and Naloxone) Antitrust Litig., No. 13-cv-2445 (E.D. Pa.) (representing a pharmaceutical wholesaler and proposed class of direct purchasers of Reckitt Benckiser’s opioid addiction drug, Suboxone, alleging that Reckitt Benckiser took several actions to suppress competition from generic versions of Suboxone) (Faruqi & Faruqi is co-lead counsel)
• In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litigation, No. 08-C-782 (N.D. Ill.) (representing purchasers of text messaging services alleging price-fixing in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act)
• In re Tricor Antitrust Litigation, No. 05-360 (D. Del.) (represented PacifiCare, a large third-party payor challenging the conduct of Abbott Laboratories and Laboratories Fournier in suppressing generic drug competition, in violation of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act) (settled for undisclosed amount)
• In re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litigation, No. 08-2431 (E.D. Pa.) (representing a pharmaceutical wholesaler and proposed class of direct purchasers challenging the conduct of SmithKline Beecham Corp. and Biovail Laboratories in delaying generic drug competition, in violation of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act) (partially settled for $37.5M)
• In re Celebrex Antitrust Litig., No. 14-00361 (E.D. Va.) (representing a pharmaceutical wholesaler and a proposed class of direct purchasers of Pfizer’s blockbuster anti-inflammatory drug, Celebrex, alleging that Pfizer procured a patent by fraud and then filed patent litigation against generic drugmakers to delay their entry into the market with less-expensive generic versions of Celebrex, which had annual sales of over $1 billion during the relevant time) (settled for $94 million)
• In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., No. 12-00995 (D.N.J.) (representing a pharmaceutical wholesaler and a proposed class of direct purchasers of SmithKline Beecham’s epilepsy/bipolar disorder treatment drug, Lamictal, alleging that SmithKline entered a reverse payment patent settlement with Teva to delay launching its first filed generic which would compete with SmithKline’s $2 billion a year Lamictal Tablets)
• Smith Drug Co. v. Actavis (Namenda), No. 15-7488 (S.D.N.Y.) (representing a pharmaceutical wholesaler and a proposed class of direct purchasers of Actavis’ Namenda XR, alleging that Actavis Actavis engaged in an illegal product hop to move the market from Namenda to Namenda XR in order to thwart competition from generic Namenda) (settled for $750 million)
• In re Opana Antitrust Litig., No. 14-10150 (N.D. Ill.) (representing a pharmaceutical wholesaler and a proposed class of direct purchasers of Endo Pharmaceuticals’ Opana ER, alleging that Endo and would-be generic competitor Impax Laboratories entered an illegal reverse payment agreement under which Endo paid Impax more than $100 million to delay launching a less-expensive generic version of Opana ER)
• In re Intuniv Antitrust Litig., No. 16-cv-12653 (D. Mass.) (representing a class of direct purchasers of Shire’s guanfacine, Intuniv, alleging that Shire paid its would-be generic competitor, Actavis, tens of millions of dollars to delay entering the market with less-expensive generic versions of Intuniv) (settled with Actavis for $19.9 million, litigation continues as to Shire).
• In re Zetia (Ezetimibe) Antitrust Litig., No. 18-md-02836 (E.D. Va.) (representing a pharmaceutical wholesaler and direct purchasers of Zetia, alleging that Merck, Glenmark and Par entered into a reverse payment settlement delaying entry of generic Zetia).
• In re Restasis (Cyclosporine Ophthalmic Emulsion) Antitrust Litig., No. 18-md-2819 (E.D.N.Y.) (representing a pharmaceutical wholesaler and proposed class of direct purchasers of Allergan’s drug, Restasis, alleging that Allergan took several actions to suppress and delay generic competition) (settled for $51 million).
• In re Novartis and Par Antitrust Litig., No. 18-cv-04361 (S.D.N.Y.) (representing a pharmaceutical wholesaler and a proposed class of direct purchasers of Novartis’s hypertension drug, Exforge, alleging that Novartis and would-be generic competitor Par entered a reverse payment agreement under which Novartis paid Par to delay launching its generic version of Exforge).
• In re Seroquel XR (Extended Release Quetiapine Fumarate) Litig., No. 20-cv-01076 (D. Del.) (representing a proposed class of direct purchasers of AstraZeneca’s anti-psychotic drug, Seroquel XR, alleging that AstraZeneca paid its would-be generic competitors, Handa and Accord, to delay entering the market with less-expensive generic versions of Seroquel XR).
• In re EpiPen Direct Purchaser Litig., No. 20-cv-0827 (D. Minn.) (representing a pharmaceutical wholesaler and a proposed class of direct purchasers of Mylan’s EpiPen, an epinephrine auto-injector used to treat anaphylaxis, alleging that Mylan paid bribes and kickbacks to the PBMs CVS/Caremark, Express Scripts, and OptumRx to artificially maintain and raise the price of EpiPen, in violation of the Sherman Act and RICO).
• In re Bystolic Antitrust Litig., No. 20-cv-05735 (S.D.N.Y) (representing a proposed class of direct purchasers of Forest’s blood pressure drug, Bystolic, alleging that Forest entered into reverse payment settlements with several would-be generic competitors to delay market entry of generic Bystolic).
• In re Generic Pharmaceuticals Pricing Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 2724 (E.D. Pa.) (representing a pharmaceutical wholesaler and a proposed class of direct purchasers alleging that dozens of generic pharmaceutical manufacturers conspired to fix prices and allocate markets for hundreds of different generic drugs).